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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2a-
3(2)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
appeals transferred from the Supreme Court. This is an appeal from the final judgment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court regarding transferred by the Supreme Court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by taking jurisdiction over a dispute between a 
Homeowner's Association and an individual homeowner where the governing CC&Rs 
contained a mandatory arbitration provision? 
Standard of Review: Because the trial court based its decision on documentary 
evidence and did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts, the Utah Court of 
Appeals should review the decision for correctness, according no particular deference to the 
trial court's decision. Cade v. Zions First National Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 
1998)(trial court determined the parties had agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, 
basing this determination on documentary evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing 
on the disputed facts); see also Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1995) (stating that determination of whether valid arbitration agreement exists is a 
question of law). 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
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2. Whether the mandatory arbitration provision was waived by Mr. Rich? 
Standard of Review: Determining whether a party waived its contractual right to 
arbitrate includes mixed questions of law and fact. See Cedar Surgery Ctr., L.L.C v. Bonelli, 
96 P.3d 911, 913 (Utah 2004). In particular, "whether the trial court employed the proper 
standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions 
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations, to which we give a district court deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 
572, 576 (Utah 1999). 
3. Whether the trial court erred by setting aside the decision of the arbitration panel? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court's "scope of review is limited to the legal 
issue of whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or 
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961 
P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by proceeding with a temporary injunction hearing 
under rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without first deciding whether it had 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rich? 
Standard of Review: Because this pretrial jurisdictional decision was made on 
documentary evidence only at the time of the temporary restraining order, it presents only 
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d 204 
(Utah 1999). When a motion is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has 
no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due 
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process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional 
determination becomes a question of law upon which the appellate court does not defer to the 
district court. State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
5. Whether the trial court erred by finding there was an adequate summons when the 
summons was defective on its face under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a 
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). 
6. Whether the trial court erred by not requiring a bond before issuing a Temporary 
Restraining Order under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a 
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). 
7. Whether the trial court erred by setting the matter for a four day jury trial at the pre-
trial conference and subsequently, upon the request of Plaintiffs, withdrawing the matter from 
the province of a jury and converting the matter to a bench trial under Rule 39 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure one week before the trial started? 
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a 
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). 
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8. Whether the trial court erred by awarding attorneys fees against Mr. Rich pursuant 
to a provision in the CC&Rs, which states, "members of the HO A shall not be liable to any 
party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action taken or 
failure to act was in good faith and without malice," when the Court found Mr. Rich acted in 
good faith and without malice. CC&Rs f 7.3 
Standard of Review. The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question 
of law, which the court reviews for correctness. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 983 P.2d 
575 (Utah 1999). 
Standard of Review. The court of appeals should review the trial court's decision 
regarding attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. "The award of attorney fees is . . . in the 
Asound discretion of the trial court.'" Willey v. Willey,951 P.2d 226,230 (Utah 1997) {quoting 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
The litigation involves a suit by a Homeowner's Association and certain individuals 
who sued to stop the construction of an addition to Mr. Rich's home in the Thaynes Canyon 
I Subdivision in Park City, Utah. Mr. Rich filed a counterclaim against the HOA. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
The litigation involves a suit by a Homeowner's Association and certain individuals 
who sued to stop the construction of an addition to Mr. Rich's home in the Thaynes Canyon 
I Subdivision in Park City, Utah. Mr. Rich resides in California and has asserted from the 
commencement of the litigation that: (1) The Third District Court does not have jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of this case because of a mandatory arbitration provision within the 
Restrictive Covenants upon which the suit by the Homeowner's Association is based; and (2) 
There has never been service of process over him and the Third District Court has not 
acquired jurisdiction over him. Despite these contentions, the Third District Court 
disregarded the mandatory arbitration provision, set aside an arbitration award in Mr. Rich's 
favor, and conducted prolonged proceedings that delayed the ultimate outcome of the case and 
significantly increased the costs to both parties. The ultimate conclusion reached by the trial 
court, after a bench trial, was in direct conflict with the decision reached by the arbitration 
panel. 
The Homeowner's Association and various individual homeowners filed suit for 
breach of contract and injunctive relief. Mr. Rich had not answered the lawsuit, but appeared 
specially and filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash. 
At the time of the hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order, Mr. Snuffer, counsel 
for Mr. Rich, appeared to contest jurisdiction and not to address the merits of the Temporary 
Restraining Order. The Third District Court did not reach a decision on whether it had 
jurisdiction, nor on whether to grant the Motion to Quash, but issued a Temporary Restraining 
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Order stopping construction on the Rich residence in Thaynes Canyon I Subdivision. At the 
time the Court entered the Order, Mr. Snuffer informed the Court he was not present to 
address the subject of the Temporary Restraining Order, his engagement was limited to 
contesting jurisdiction, and he could not accept service of any order upon the client. The 
Court directed the Order be served upon Mr. Rich. 
In addition to issuing a Temporary Restraining Order, the Court ordered the dispute 
be submitted to arbitration under the provisions of the Restrictive Covenants, and the 
arbitration take place before September 30th to avoid damages and delay to the construction 
of Mr. Rich's home. No hearing on an amount of a bond was conducted, and no bond was 
required by the Court, and no bond was posted at that time. 
The Restrictive Covenants required three arbitrators to arbitrate the matter: One chosen 
by the Homeowner's Association, one by Mr. Rich, and one chosen by the two arbitrators to 
complete the panel. The Homeowner's Association chose Mr. Steven K. Gordon. Mr. Rich 
chose Mr. David Slaughter. The two arbitrators then chose Mr. Kent B. Scott, who acted as 
panel chair. 
The Homeowner's Association and Mr. Rich then signed an agreement with the 
arbitration panel to arbitrate the dispute. The letter stated, "I would like counsel for the 
parties to confirm and acknowledge that by signing this letter that they have agreed to arbitrate 
all issues arising under Case No. 050500428MI pending in the Third District Court for 
Summit County and Assigned to Judge Bruce Lubeck." The signature below has this 
language above counsel's signatures: "Counsel for the parties acknowledge and agree that the 
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above referenced matter may be arbitrated in accordance with the Uniform Revised 
Arbitration Act and accept the arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this 
letter/5 Counsel for both parties signed. 
After signing the agreement, counsel for both parties, as well as Mr. James Kenny the 
first named individual plaintiff, president of the Homeowner's Association and himself an 
attorney, participated in a scheduling conference with the Arbitration Panel by telephone. 
During the conference a schedule was agreed to, discovery was agreed to take place, times 
were set for discovery answers, for exchange of exhibits, for filing the prehearing briefs by 
both parties and the payment of the fees. The date and time for the arbitration hearing was 
also set. In the scheduling hearing counsel for Mr. Rich said that Mr. Rich did not object to 
the authority or jurisdiction of the Arbitration Panel, but that he still contested the jurisdiction 
of the Third District Court. There were pending motions to quash and dismiss which had not 
been ruled upon at that time, and Mr. Rich did not want his submission to the arbitration to 
be consent to the Court's general jurisdiction over him. 
Pursuant to the agreement, the Homeowner's Association signed and returned the 
arbitration agreement, paid the fees, answered discovery, submitted their prehearing exhibits 
and prehearing brief. The day before the arbitration was to take place, the Homeowner's 
Association filed an ex parte motion in the Third District Court asking that the arbitration be 
canceled, and filed a motion before the Arbitration Panel asking them to cancel the arbitration. 
The motion was granted by the Third District Court. The Arbitration Panel denied the motion. 
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When the Third District Court granted the order canceling the Court ordered arbitration, a 
copy of the order was delivered to the Arbitration Panel by the Homeowner's Association. 
On the morning set for the arbitration to take place, the Arbitration Panel convened the 
hearing and first addressed the question of whether to continue or cancel the arbitration. The 
Arbitration Panel called counsel for the Homeowner's Association to discuss the matter. 
Counsel for the Homeowner' s Association argued the Court had canceled the hearing and that 
it could not proceed. The panel considered the arguments of the Homeowner's Association, 
considered the Order of the Third District Court, and deliberated the matter. By a unanimous 
decision of the panel, Mr. Scott, Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Gordon concluded the panel had 
jurisdiction independent of the Third District Court, and that their authority was derived from 
a written agreement to arbitrate, and the Court's decision did not affect the authority of the 
Arbitration Panel. Therefore they determined to proceed. They informed the attorney for the 
Homeowner's Association of that decision and invited him to appear, but he declined and said 
neither he nor his clients would appear. Thereafter despite the absence of the Homeowner's 
Association, the hearing proceeded. The Arbitration Panel considered the submissions of the 
Homeowner's Association and their prehearing brief, documentary exhibits and arguments. 
The Arbitration Panel issued a decision in favor of Mr. Rich. 
The Third District Court then conducted a hearing under an Order to Show Cause, as 
a result of which the Third District Court has set aside the decision of the Arbitration Panel 
and ordered Mr. Rich to proceed to respond to a Preliminary Injunction hearing, without ever 
having decided whether there has been adequate service. The Third District Court decided 
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it had jurisdiction, although Mr. Rich has only appeared specially. It also decided the 
defective summons was valid, although finding the summons defective under Rule 12. 
Defendant raised all issues of jurisdiction, service, defects in the summons and the propriety 
of the arbitration matter being in the lower Court. 
The decision of the Arbitration Panel should have been confirmed by the district court. 
Alternatively the district court should have concluded there was no remaining dispute to 
litigate. Instead, the district court proceeded to decide a matter which was moot. The district 
court caused the parties to unnecessarily incur thousands of dollars in fees and costs, plus lose 
valuable time because the district court refused to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision. 
The district court held a bench trial on the limited issue 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. The Thaynes Canyon I HO A was created in 1971 and a Declaration of Protective 
Covenants was recorded. R. 957. 
2. Mr. Rich owns Lot 73 in the Thaynes Canyon Subdivision, at the address of 57 
Thaynes Canyon. Id. 
3. The Declaration states that "all buildings and structures on all Lots shall be setback at 
least 10 feet from the side and rear lot lines. Sec. 6.4. R. 957-58. 
4. Mr. Rich was granted a building permit on August 10, 2005, by Park City Planning 
Commission to build an addition to the residence on Lot 73. R. 958. The Park City 
Municipal Code required a five foot setback from property lines at that time. Id. 
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After being notified of the 10 foot setback provision, the licensed architect for Mr. 
Rich (Mr. DeCarlo) changed the plans to twice "step back" the addition to that shown 
on the plans submitted to the architectural committee. R. 959. 
The architectural committee held a meeting on July 21,2005 regarding the addition to 
Mr. Rich's residence. R. 960. No one ever told Mr. DeCarlo when or where the 
meeting would be held. Id. 
Neither Mr. Rich or Mr. DeCarlo had an opportunity to make a presentation at the July 
21, 2005 meeting. R. 961. 
At the July 21, 2005 meeting, the Architectural Committee decided to reject the plans 
submitted by Mr. Rich. Id. 
During or just after the meeting, Mr. Kenny called Mr. Rich and left a voice message 
the plans were not approved. Id. 
Mr. Rich did not receive the message until August as Mr. Rich was on vacation. Id. 
On August 26, 2005, DeCarlo delivered a letter (Def. Ex. 4) to Kenney. R. 963. A 
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Appendix 5. 
The August 26, 2005 letter states, "John Rich would like this matter to be resolved 
under 'Arbitration of Disputes" clause in the CCRs." See Appendix 5. 
Mr. Rich, through Mr. DeCarlo, asked for arbitration on the basis of hardship, a permit 
issued by Park City and the encroachment was minor. R. 963. 
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14. A Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Jury Trial was filed on August 
19,2005. R. 00001. A motion and memorandum for temporary restraining order were 
also filed on August 19, 2005. 
150 On September 16, 2005, Mr. Rich filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis Section 8.3 
of the Declaration required the dispute be submitted to arbitration. R.33-35. 
16. On September 16, 2005, Mr. Rich filed a Motion to Quash on the basis the summons 
was defective and not properly served on Mr. Rich. R. 30-32. 
17. Without making any determination on the personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rich, the 
Court entered a temporary restraining order against Mr. Rich on September 16, 2007. 
R.45-48. 
18. The Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute contemplated by Section 8.3 of 
the Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision dated August 
26, 1971, by September 30, 2005. R. 47. 
19. Under Section 8.3 of the Declaration, three arbitrators were required: one chosen by 
the HO A, one by Mr. Rich, and one by the two arbitrators. R.00001, Ex. 1, pg. 13. 
20. The HOA chose Mr. Steven K. Gordon. R. 248, Ex. 1, pg. 3. 
21. Mr. Rich chose Mr. David Slaughter. Id. 
22. The two arbitrators then chose Mr. Kent B. Scott, who acted as the panel chair. Id. 
23. On or about September 23, 2005, the parties signed an arbitration agreement. R.89, 
Ex. 2; R.248, Ex. l,pg. 3. 
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24. By signing the arbitration agreement, the parties confirmed and acknowledged that 
they agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 MI pending in the 
Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubeck. Id. 
25. Above the signature lines for the parties, the arbitration agreement states, "Counsel for 
the parties acknowledge and agree that the above referenced matter may be arbitrated 
in accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and accept the 
arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this letter." Id. 
26. The Panel and counsel for the HOA and Mr. Rich, as well as Mr. Kenny, participated 
in a preliminary scheduling conference on September 23, 2005. Id. Neither counsel 
for the HOA, nor Mr. Kenny, raised any objections to the Panel or the hearing. Id. 
Counsel for Mr. Rich stated that he had reservations concerning the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Id. However, he stated that he had no reservations about the Panel's 
jurisdiction or the matter being arbitrated. Id. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration 
hearing. Id. 
27. At the preliminary scheduling conference, the Panel and counsel scheduled the 
arbitration hearing for September 28, 2005. R.89, Ex. 2, ^ 4 pg. 3. The Panel and 
counsel also discussed pre-hearing matters, including the parties' execution of the 
Agreement, the rules applicable to the arbitration hearing, motions, discovery, 
exchange of witness lists and exhibits, form of the award and pre-hearing briefs. Id. 
A Preliminary Scheduling Conference and Order was entered and sent to counsel. Id. 
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28. On the afternoon before the hearing, Mr. Tesch requested cancellation of the 
arbitration based upon the argument that Mr. Rich had "objected to the jurisdiction of 
the panel." Id. at f^ 7. This was not true. Id. The Panel never received any objection 
to its jurisdiction from Mr. Rich or his counsel. Id. Mr. Tesch did not request a 
hearing. 
30. Mr. Tesch obtained an ex parte order from the district court that purported to cancel 
the "court-ordered" mediation. Id. at^ f 8. There was no indication in the Court's order 
that the Court had been informed that the parties had signed the agreement, which 
conferred jurisdiction on the Panel independent of any prior court order. Id. 
31. On September 27, 2005, the Panel emailed a letter to Mr. Tesch and Mr. Snuffer 
acknowledging receipt of Judge Lubeck's Order canceling the arbitration proceeding. 
R. 301, Ex. I, Ex. 8. 
32. The Panel determined the arbitration should proceed and that counsel should be heard 
on the HOA's request that the Panel cancel the arbitration hearing. Id.; R.89, Ex. 2, 
If 10.. 
32. The Panel unanimously decided that although the arbitration was initially ordered by 
the Court, it ceased to be Court-ordered when the parties executed the Agreement, in 
which they consented in writing to the arbitration of all issues in the underlying case, 
consented to use the arbitrators that had been appointed, and participated in a 
preliminary scheduling conference relating to the governance of the arbitration 
process. Id. at f^ 13. 
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33. The arbitration proceeded not pursuant to the Court's order, but rather pursuant to the 
agreement consistent with paragraph 8.3 of the CC&Rs, which granted jurisdiction to 
the Panel independent of any court order. Id. at f 14. 
34. The Panel concluded that Mr. Rich was entitled to a variance of paragraph 6.4 of the 
CC&Rs and awarded Mr. Rich attorney's fees and costs. Id. at ^ 3. 
3 5. Pursuant to the Interim Arbitration Award, Mr. Snuffer submitted fees and costs in the 
amount of $7,050.25. 
36. The district court entered a ruling and order on October 6, 2005, vacating the 
arbitration award. R.235. 
37. The arbitration panel reviewed the ruling and order of the district court. The panel 
unanimously concluded the arbitration was conducted in accordance with controlling 
authority. R. 301, Ex. I, Ex. 4. 
38. Mr. Rich did not act with malice or in bad faith during the litigation. R. 1068. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The arbitration agreement in the CC&Rs was controlling. Mr. Rich did not 
waive the arbitration provision under Utah law. The district court did not have the authority 
to vacate the arbitration award, especially for the reason that Mr. Rich reserved his right in 
the arbitration proceeding to contest jurisdiction pursuant to his pending motion to dismiss 
and motion to quash. 
2. The parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, signed the arbitration agreement and 
submitted arbitration briefs to the panel. The parties and their counsel participated in a 
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scheduling conference for the arbitration and submitted to the jurisdiction of the panel. The 
panel was independently authorized by the arbitration agreements signed by the parties to 
arbitrate the dispute. The district court did not have the authority to vacate the arbitration 
award. 
3. The court could not enter a temporary restraining order without first addressing 
the personal jurisdiction objection raised by Mr. Rich. Jurisdiction is a fundamental 
requirement before a court has authority to take any action against a party. 
4. The summons allegedly served on Mr. Rich was defective because it required an 
answer within twenty days instead of the thirty day period required in Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for out of state residents. 
5. The district court failed to require security under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
6. The district court erroneously took the trial of this matter away from the jury and 
restricted the trial to the issue of abandonment. 
7. The district court's award of attorney's fees violated Section 7.3 of the Declaration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Arbitration Provision in the CC&Rs was Controlling 
Section 8.3 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon 
Subdividision (hereinafter "CC&Rs") requires the arbitration of all controversies arising 
under or with respect to the CC&Rs. Defendant Rich properly notified the Thaynes Canyon 
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Homeowner's Association ("HOA") of his desire to arbitrate the dispute. Utah courts have 
recognized that arbitration has much to recommend it. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 
(Utah 2004). 
A. No Waiver of Arbitration 
Under Utah law, courts "interpret contracts in favor of arbitration," Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest, 40 P.3d 599, 606 (Utah 2002). The district court erroneously 
concluded for two reasons that Mr. Rich waived his right to arbitrate the dispute. R. 202-204. 
First, the district court concluded the demand for arbitration must be by certified mail or 
registered mail as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-110. R. 202. Because Mr. DeCarlo 
hand-delivered the arbitration demand, the district court found the demand was not valid. R. 
202-203. However, the statute only requires notice via certified mail in the absence of 
agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-110(1). Section 8.3 of the Declaration provides 
that any party desiring to arbitrate any controversy shall file written notice of his desire with 
the Association within 30 days after he discovers, learns or has notice of such determination, 
decision or action. R.00001, Ex. 1. The notification hand-delivered by DeCarlo met the 
requirements in Section 8.3 of the Declaration. 
The second reason for finding waiver was the arbitration demand was untimely. The 
district court found Mr. Rich did not receive the telephone message from Mr. Kenny until 
August, after Mr. Rich returned from his vacation. R.961. On August 26,2005, Mr. DeCarlo 
delivered the arbitration demand to Mr. Kenny. The demand was received within 30 days of 
when Mr. Rich received notice of the decision by the architectural committee not to accept 
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his plans, which was sometime in August when he returned from vacation. The letter clearly 
sets forth the reasons for the arbitration request. See Appendix 5. Therefore, the demand is 
within the time required by Section 8.3 in the Declaration. The district court's conclusion Mr. 
Rich "knew of the decision of the Association Trustees July 21, 2005 is contradicted by the 
district court's specific finding Mr. Rich did not receive the voice message from Mr. Kenny 
until August, when Mr. Rich returned from his vacation. 
Even if the HOA argues Mr. Rich received notice when the committee contacted Mr. 
DeCarlo, this still does not constitute waiver under Utah law. In Utah the law favors 
arbitration and as such, there is a strong presumption against finding that a party waived its 
right to arbitration. See Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.3d 580 (Utah 2002); Central Fla. Invs.f Inc. 
v. ParkwestAssocs^ 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). Consistent with general waiver jurisprudence, 
see Soter 's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993)(defming 
waiver as the "intentional relinquishment of a known right"(quotation omitted)), Utah courts 
have held that a "waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional," and a court may infer 
waiver only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to 
disregard its right to arbitrate. Cent. Fla., 40 P.3d at 608. To determine whether a party 
waived its right to arbitrate, the court must look to whether the party substantially participated 
in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and if so, whether that 
participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. Id. The HOA has the burden of 
establishing substantial participation and prejudice. Id. 
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Mr. Rich did not willingly participate in the underlying litigation, but fought the far 
reaching rulings of the district court every step of the way. First, Mr. Rich filed a motion to 
dismiss based on the arbitration agreement. Secondly, Mr. Rich filed a motion to quash the 
summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Mr. Rich willingly accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Arbitration panel, while contesting the jurisdiction of the district court. Mr. 
Rich participated in the arbitration process, attended the scheduling conference for the 
arbitration proceeding via his counsel, and had his counsel attend the actual arbitration 
proceeding. Mr. Rich filed an arbitration brief and served discovery on the HOA in 
preparation of the arbitration proceeding. All of these activities demonstrated that Mr. Rich 
was protecting his right to arbitrate the dispute and resisting any attempts to litigate the case. 
When Mr. Rich filed his answer to the complaint, Mr. Rich raised arbitration as an affirmative 
defense. R. 454. The decision by the district court that Mr. Rich waived his right to arbitrate 
the case is not supported in the record and should be reversed. 
B. Arbitration Panel Interim Award Binding Upon the Parties 
The decision of the Arbitration Panel was binding upon the parties. It is well 
established that the decision as to whether the arbitration of a dispute is to be set aside only 
under the Arbitration Act itself. See, e.g., Alfred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass 'n., 909 P.2d 1263 
(Utah 1996). The controlling law of Utah is that: 
The Act supports arbitration of both present and future disputes and reflects 
long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of 
adjudicating disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442,449,15 P.2d 353, 
356 (1932). Given the public policy and law in support of arbitration, judicial 
review of arbitration awards confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to those 
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grounds and procedures provided for under the Act. Robinson & Wells, P.C. 
v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983). In Utility Trailer Sales of Salt 
Lake, Inc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327,1329 (Utah 1987), we discussed the correct 
standard of review as follows: 
In order to serve that policy and achieve its objective, judicial 
review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or 
susceptible to repetitive adjudications, but should be limited to 
the statutory grounds and procedures for review. As a general 
rule, awards will not be disturbed on account of irregularities or 
informalities, or because the court does not agree with the 
award, so long as the proceeding has been fair and honest and 
the substantial rights of the parties have been respected. 
(Citing Robinson, 669 P.2d at 846.) 
The Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31 a-1, et. seq. makes vacating an arbitration proceeding 
limited to the following enumerated bases: 
...the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
b) there was: 
i)evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; 
ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the 
arbitration proceeding; 
c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient 
cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the 
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78-3 la-
116, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding; 
d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the 
arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78-3 la-
116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an 
arbitration as required in Section 78-3 la-110 so as to substantially prejudice 
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
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None of these apply. Further, the decision of the Third District Court was not based 
upon any of these reasons. There was no allegation nor any basis for setting aside the 
Arbitration Panel's decision based upon "corruption, fraud, or other undue means." There 
was no allegation of an arbitrator or the panel being less than impartial or even any hint they 
engaged in misconduct in conducting the proceedings which resulted in prejudice. There was 
nothing improper in the Arbitration Panel's decision to not postpone the hearing. Indeed, the 
Arbitration Panel weighed the request to continue the hearing, heard argument, considered 
the Third District Court's decision to lift the Court's order to arbitrate, and informed both 
parties in writing and orally that they determined to proceed. 
There was nothing in the notice or scheduling which was inappropriate. Indeed, the 
schedule was set with the agreement of both parties. The Homeowner's Association met the 
deadlines for discovery and for submission of the pre-hearing brief and exchange of exhibits. 
The scheduling dispute does not exist. What exists is a false contention of the Homeowner's 
Association which the Third District Court accepted that Mr. Rich did not intend to be bound 
by the arbitration result. Both the Homeowner's Association and the Third District Court 
should have known better because: 
1. It was Mr. Rich who contended at the outset that this entire matter required 
arbitration and could not be the subject of a Court proceeding. See, e.g., Mr. Rich's Motion 
to Dismiss, R. 26-36. 
2. It was Mr. Rich who requested in writing that the arbitration be conducted. Id. 
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3. When the scheduling hearing before the Arbitration Panel was conducted, the 
Panel asked whether Mr. Rich intended to be bound by the results of the arbitration. He 
responded "that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the mater being 
arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing." R. 89, Ex. 2; R.248, Ex. 1, pg. 3. 
4. Mr. Rich stated through counsel at the hearing on September 16th, and again in the 
hearing on October 6th, that he intended to be bound by the arbitration. 
Thus, when the Homeowner's Association filed a motion with the Court stating that 
Mr. Rich did not intend to be bound by the outcome of the arbitration, the Homeowner's 
Association knew that to be contrary to the repeated declarations of Mr. Rich. The Third 
District Court adopted the Homeowner's Association's accusations and have echoed them 
in the Ruling and Order being appealed. The Third District Court stated: "defendant was 
attempting to seek arbitration but attempting to avoid it if it was unfavorable to him.'" R. 199. 
The Homeowner's Association had been present in the discussion before the Arbitration 
Panel when Mr. Rich stated "that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the 
mater being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing." R. 89, Ex. 2, ^ f 4 pg. 3. 
Thus, although the Homeowner' s Association has raised this argument, and the Third District 
Court has adopted it as a fact, it was erroneous and known to the Homeowner's Association 
to be erroneous when they made the application to the Third District Court to vacate the order 
to arbitrate. 
The Arbitration Panel had all this before it. They also had the Third District Court's 
Order vacating the arbitration before them. They had participated in the scheduling 
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conference and were aware of Mr. Rich's answer "that he had no reservations about the 
Panel' s jurisdiction or the mater being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing." 
R. 89, Ex. 2, [^ 4 pg. 3. Therefore, the Arbitration Panel concluded that the arbitration would 
be binding upon Mr. Rich, and that Mr. Rich had consented to the arbitration. 
The agreement to arbitrate, accepted by both parties, provides that the parties "agree 
to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428MI pending in the Third District 
Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubek." R. 89, Ex. 2, ^ 3 pg. 3. 
The Third District Court's Order did not require the parties to sign any agreement to 
arbitrate. It simply directed that arbitration take place. The parties on their own agreed to 
the written arbitration terms. The parties agreed that they would not merely arbitrate the 
question of the Homeowner's Association's complaint about the home addition going 
partially into the ten foot setback, but also to arbitrate "all issues arising under Case No. 
050500428MI pending in the Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge 
Bruce C Lubek'' R. 89, Ex. 2, ^ f 4 pg. 3. Thus the agreement, entered into after a dispute 
had arisen, takes the entire dispute out of Judge Lubeck's hands and puts it before the 
Arbitration Panel. 
When arbitration is selected, as here, it is governed by the Utah Uniform Arbitration 
Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la-101 to -131 (2003). The Utah legislature promotes 
alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration, because it Mreduce[s] the need for judicial 
resources and the time and expense of the parties." Id. § 78-3 lb-3(2)(c). Arbitration is meant 
to offer an alternative or supplement to the formal processes associated with a court trial and 
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to promote the efficient and effective operation of the courts of this state by authorizing and 
encouraging the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of civil actions filed in the courts of this state. Id. § 78-3 lb-
3(1). Utah courts have also recognized the strong public policy favoring arbitration Mas an 
approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion." 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992). Arbitration 
proceedings benefit the parties by providing "a method more expeditious and less expensive 
[than the court system] for the resolution of disputes." Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady 
Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1932) ("[Arbitration is favored in the law 
as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating differences."). The use of arbitration as 
an alternative to traditional judicial proceedings should therefore be encouraged. Pac. Dev., 
L.C. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001). 
Arbitration is "a matter of contract." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 40 P.3d 
599 (Utah 2002). The parties to the arbitration determine the scope and questions to be 
resolved during the proceedings and the arbitrator must not exceed the scope defined in the 
parties1 written agreement. Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 
323 (Utah 1998). Moreover, arbitration contracts are to be enforced according to their terms, 
and arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the manner to which the parties have 
agreed. Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 480. 
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The Third District Court has erred in vacating the arbitration award. The travesty of 
this error is evident in the attorney's fees and costs requested by Mr. Rich after entry of the 
arbitration award ($7,050.25) and the attorney's fees and costs requested by the HOA after 
the trial ($119,539). 
II. The District Court Did Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant 
The Third District Court erred by proceeding to enter a temporary restraining order 
without first deciding whether it had jurisdiction over Mr. Rich. The question of jurisdiction 
is threshold to further proceedings. Yet Mr. Rich was left in limbo from the onset of this 
case as to whether or not there was jurisdiction over him even being asserted by the Third 
District Court. "A threshold issue is whether or not this court has jurisdiction to hear [the 
matter]. If a court lacks jurisdiction 'it has not power to entertain the suit.' Curtis v. Curtis, 
789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Not only can a court not entertain 
the suit, the parties cannot cure the jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent." Crump v. 
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, from the hearing on September 16, 
2005, to the October 6,2005 time frame, Mr. Rich was left not knowing whether or not there 
was any jurisdiction over him being asserted by the Third District Court. Given the contract 
of the parties in which they "agree to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 
050500428MI pending in the Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge 
Bruce C. Lubeck," it would appear that while the jurisdictional question remained 
unresolved by the Court, the parties agreed to remove the jurisdiction from the Third District 
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Court and place it exclusively in their Arbitration Panel. Accordingly, the Third District 
Court was without jurisdiction to proceed further in Case No. 050500428. 
III. The Summons Was Defective 
The Summons was never served on Mr. Rich, was defective and should have been 
quashed. The affidavits of Mr. Rich (R. 248 Ex. 1, Ex. 10) and his daughter (R. 248, Ex. 1, 
Ex. 11) both state that no "woman" resides at the home of Mr. Rich (a widower whose wife 
died of cancer ten years ago and who has not remarried and does not cohabitate with another 
person). Someone left a copy of the summons on Mr. Rich's porch in California on one 
occasion and a copy in his mailbox on another occasion. Both of those were retrieved by his 
son. Mr. Rich did not received service. 
Further, the summons was directed at an out-of-state defendant. It allowed only 
twenty (20) days to respond. It should have required thirty (30), as the Third District Court 
notes in its decision. R. 194. Despite this defect the Court concluded that "the 
misinformation conveyed in the summons does not go to the heart of the basis for service" 
and therefore decides it will be waived by the Court. R. 194. This was error. 
This action should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the 
defective summons based on Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975). In Martin the 
process was defective because the summons stated that an answer was required to be filed 
in twenty days instead of the thirty days required in the rules. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the defects in the summons made the process invalid and that the defects were 
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jurisdictional. Id. The lower Court's decision that it has jurisdiction was an error and to 
continue the proceedings in the face of that error compounds the error. 
The omission of the mandatory statements required by Rule 4 renders a summons 
"fatally defective." Sticking Mayflower v. Jordanelle, 47 P.3d 86, 89 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001); 
Wasatch Livestock Loan Co., 46 P.2d at 399 (interpreting earlier procedural statute that 
mirrors Rule 4(c)(1)); see also Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1955); Farmer's 
Banking Co. v. Bullen, 111 P. 969, 971 (Utah 1923). Therefore, the Court has no authority 
to merely waive the mandatory statements set forth in Rule 4 (such as out of state defendants 
have thirty days to respond to the complaint). Before the requirement to endorse and date 
the time of service was omitted from the rules, the Utah Supreme Court held that failure of 
a process server to indorse the date and time of service on the summons is "fatally defective 
when the defendant appears timely and specially to quash the service." Dynapac, Inc. v. 
Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976). Such reasoning should still apply to a 
defective summons which all admit had the wrong time frame for answering on it. The 
Court's reasoning that "the misinformation conveyed in the summons does not go to the heart 
of the basis for service" is clearly erroneous. (Exhibit 1, page 18.) Misinformation and 
misdirection to the defendant in a document which misstates his obligation to answer does 
go to the heart of the basis of service. The lower Court is overruling the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court and saying that due process in Utah no longer 
requires compliance with the law or accurate notice to a foreign defendant being hailed into 
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Court here. Certainly Utah would not want a similar rule adopted by sister states and used 
against its residents. And so here we should not permit such a rule to be created. 
IV, Lack of bond. 
In the rush of ex parte proceedings below, the Third District Court erred by not 
requiring a bond before issuing a Temporary Restraining Order. While it is true that you can 
issue a Temporary Restraining Order without requiring a bond (see, e.g., Corp. President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wallace, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990), 
the decision of whether there is a bond required turns on an inquiry into whether there will 
be harm to the defendant if such an order is issued. (See, e.g., Hutchins v. Trombley, 509 
P.2d 579 (Idaho 1973)). Rule 65A mandates security: "The court shall condition issuance 
of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the applicant." (Emphasis added.) The 
Third District Court, in its haste to issue the Temporary Restraining Order below, did not 
require security. This despite the fact that the order would interrupt construction, which 
cannot occur in late September in Park City without inflicting winter construction conditions 
upon the project. Indeed, the lower Court ordered the quick arbitration because of the 
admittedly expensive effects of such an order upon the construction. However, the 
Temporary Restraining Order was then prepared, submitted to the Court and signed before 
counsel for Mr. Rich had any opportunity to give input. Later, when the defect was pointed 
out to the Court, the Court did not make any findings that there was no damage, but rather 
added language to its Ruling and Order after the fact faulting Mr. Rich for the failure to get 
27 
security (thereby shifting the responsibility for the defect from the applicant who had the duty 
under Rule 65 A to the defendant). The Court's reasoning went on to explain it would be the 
Homeowner's Association who "even if the TRO is wrongly issued, would be responsible 
for any damages occasioned by the wrongful issuance of the TRO." 
V. The Court Erred by Striking the Jury On the Eve of Trial 
The HOA originally demanded a jury trial without limiting their demand to any 
particular claims. R.00007. The HOA paid the jury fee and never expressed any desire to 
withdraw their request for a jury trial. The complaint included a claim for breach of contract, 
as well as claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, thus clearly entitling plaintiffs to a jury 
trial. R. 921. On the eve of trial, just 13 days before trial was to commence, the HOA 
withdrew their claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief. R. 802. Therefore, the 
HOA asked the Court to strike the jury trial and simultaneously objected to trial by jury. R. 
802. The district court noted the Mr. Rich never consented to the request to withdraw the 
jury demand and therefore striking the jury was not possible under Rule 38(d). R.000920, 
R929. However, the Court eliminated the jury under Rule 39 just one week before the jury 
trial was scheduled to begin. Id. 
The district court believed the issue was whether Mr. Rich was entitled to a jury trial 
on abandonment. R.929. The court acknowledged that Mr. Rich was "clearly" entitled to 
a jury trial on issues such as bad faith, liability of the trustees, damages and so forth. Id. 
However, the court reasoned that since the HOA was not entitled to a jury trial on whether 
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a permanent injunction should issue, then Mr. Rich was not entitled to a jury trial unless Mr. 
Rich had a right to a jury trial to defeat a claim for injunction. R. 930. 
The court acknowledged that there was a factual and legal dispute about whether a 
setback provision had been abandoned. The court determined the first issue to be addressed 
under abandonment was the number and nature of the violations. R. 933. The court admitted 
this analysis was "mostly, however, a factual determination a jury could make." Id. The 
court acknowledged the next question under abandonment, other instances of enforcement, 
was also largely a factual question. Id. The final element of abandonment, whether their 
remains any benefit to enforcement, was viewed as purely a legal determination by the court. 
Id. Despite finding that a jury could certainly make findings as to some of the factual 
aspects of abandonment, including the number of violations and any prior acts of 
enforcement, the court determined the matter was purely an equitable matter and must be 
decided by the court. R.936. 
As numerous Utah courts have indicated, the right of trial by jury is one which should 
be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party had demanded such a trial, he is 
entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact. It is not the trial court's 
prerogative to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own. First Sec. Bank v. 
Ezra C Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886 (1969); Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643 (1966); 
See statements in Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Const. Co., 509 P.2d 356 (1973); Roche v. Zee, 264 
P.2d 855 (1953); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (1952). 
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Mr. Rich rightfully relied upon Plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial from the start of this 
case. Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, without any limitation on the demand, and Mr. Rich 
therefore prepared the case for a jury trial. Both parties exchanged the actual exhibits for the 
jury trial and submitted witness lists for the four day jury trial. Until Plaintiffs dropped their 
breach of contract claims and declaratory judgment claims on the eve of trial in a transparent 
effort to limit their claims to non-jury equitable claims, the parties in this case had consented 
to a jury verdict on all issues, legal and equitable, under Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-2. Although express consent is not necessary, see Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Assoc, 896 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah App. 1995)(citation omitted), the parties 
expressly consented to trial by jury of all legal and equitable claims. Therefore, the district 
court should have denied the Plaintiffs' request to withdraw their jury demand and present 
both the legal and equitable issues in this proceeding to the jury. By taking the issues away 
from the jury just seven days before trial, the court caused serious prejudice to Defendant 
Rich who had relied upon Plaintiff s jury demand and prepared this case for a civil jury trial. 
Federal courts have concluded considerations of fairness to the litigants indicate that 
Rule 39(c) should not be interpreted to allow a judge to rule a jury verdict advisory after the 
parties have begun to implement their trial plan. Id. at 1243 (citations omitted). Any good 
trial lawyer will acknowledge there are significant tactical differences in presenting and 
arguing a case to a jury as opposed to a judge. Id. 
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The district court's decision to first decide the equitable claims and then empanel the 
jury and determine any legal issues if necessary, directly contradicts the holding in Zions 
Bankv, Rocky Mtn. Irr., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990). In Zions, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted: 
The distinction between issues triable at law and those triable in equity serves 
to delineate the scope of the right to a jury trial under our case law. In 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 
626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), we held that article I, section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil cases. In Hyatt v. Hill, 
714 P.2d 299 (Utah 1986), we made it clear that this constitutional right to a 
jury trial in civil cases extends only to cases that would have been cognizable 
at law at the time the constitution was adopted. Rocky Mountain was the first 
of the parties to bring suit. Because of the later realignment of the various 
actions by the court, Rocky Mountain's claims were transformed into 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. This realignment could not have 
changed, and did not change, the nature of any issue from legal to equitable. 
Rocky Mountain should have been afforded its right to a jury trial on the issue 
of whether the two notes creating the line of credit were materially and 
fraudulently altered. Such a claim raised by a plaintiff at the time our 
constitution was adopted would have been triable to a jury. See, e.g., Petty v. 
Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 569-70 (1942). The facts that the claim also constituted 
an affirmative defense to a foreclosure and that foreclosures were tried in 
equity at the time the constitution was adopted do not change the issue from 
legal to equitable. In International Harvester, we noted that our analysis was 
in harmony with that of the United States Supreme Court on the issue of the 
right to a jury trial in civil cases when equitable issues are also involved. 
International Harvester, 626 P.2d at 421 n. 2. In the federal courts, there is no 
question that when legal and equitable issues turn on the same operative facts, 
a jury must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual determination binds 
the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue. See, e.g., Lytic 
v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1331,108 L.Ed.2d 
504 (1990); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 
L.Ed.2d 988 (1959), cited with approval in International Harvester; see 
generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2305, 
2306, 2338 (1971). We approve of this procedure. 
31 
Accordingly, when the right to a jury trial exists with respect to any claim, it cannot 
be vitiated by bifurcating and first trying to the court an equitable claim predicated upon 
common facts. Goldberg, 896 P.2d at 1243. Rather, the jury issues are tried to the jury first, 
and the Court is bound by the jury's findings in any subsequent decision on equitable issues. 
Therefore, the district court's determination to hear the equitable claim regarding injunctive 
relief served to vitiate the legal claim for declaratory relief filed by Defendant Rich which 
goes to the authority and existence of the HO A to deny the addition, the lack of enforcement 
of the CC&Rs in the HOA, and the lack of any proper or valid voting procedures of the 
HOA. 
Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief that the addition by Defendant Rich violated the 
side yard setback requirements was based upon the common set of facts upon which Mr. 
Rich's claims were based. Specifically, Mr. Rich claimed the preliminary injunction granted 
by the Court was wrongfully issued and Mr. Rich was entitled to delay damages resulting 
from the injunction. The same nucleus of common facts should have been decided by the 
jury to determine if the injunction was properly granted. To determine whether the injunction 
was properly granted, the jury should have determined the disputed facts in this proceeding, 
namely, to what extent, if any, did the the addition to the Rich residence encroach on the side 
yard setback. The jury should have decided whether the encroachment, if any, was material 
or substantially complied with the CC&Rs. The jury should have determined whether the 
HOA and the individual parties acted in good faith and without malice as required in Section 
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7.3 of the CC&Rs. In addition, the jury should have determined if Mr. Rich acted in good 
faith and without malice and is therefore entitled to the limitation of liability set forth in 
Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs. These are all factual issues which should have been decided by 
the trier of fact In this case, it required a decision by the jury. The district court noted these 
decisions were "certainly triable to a jury," but determined that the equitable defense of 
abandonment should be tried before the non-equitable claims presented by Mr. Rich. This 
sequencing violates the decision set forth by the Utah Supreme Court announced in Zions 
Bank above. 
VIL Trial Court Erred by Awarding Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs 
A party requesting an award of attorney fees has the burden of presenting evidence 
sufficient to support the award. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving attorney's fees in this matter. The district 
court awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Declaration. R. 991. Mr. Rich 
objected to the award of attorney's fees on several grounds. R. 1003-12. First, section 7.3 
of the Declaration states that no member of the HOA "shall be liable to any party for any 
action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action taken or the failure to 
act was in good faith and without actual malice." As a member of the HOA, Mr. Rich was 
entitled to the protection of Section 7.3 against liability for "any action" with respect to "any 
matter" if Mr. Rich acted in good faith and without actual malice." R. 1005. The district 
court agreed that Mr. Rich did not act with malice or in bad faith. R. 1068. However, the 
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district court restricted the words "any action" and "any party" as only applying to HOA 
members that bring an enforcement action, not those who are named as defendants in an 
enforcement action. R. 1067. The court found Mr. Rich's reading of 7.3 was not sensible, 
because under Mr. Rich's interpretation neither party is entitled to fees in an enforcement 
action unless bad faith is shown. R. 1067. That is exactly how provision 7.3 reads. It is not 
limited in any way other than bad faith and actual malice. Any ambiguity in the declaration 
should be construed against the HOA as the drafter of the declaration and in favor of Mr. 
Rich, The district court incorrectly limited the application of 7.3 and should therefore be 
reversed on appeal 
Mr. Rich objected to the attorney's fees requested by Plaintiffs because the affidavit 
submitted by Plaintiffs did not comply with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 
1008-10), the fee of $161,659.66 was unreasonable (R. 1010), and the costs were 
undocumentated and unsupported. R. 1011. The district court reduced the fees requested 
by Plaintiffs in the amount of $25,950, but failed to provide the basis for reaching the 
reduction. R. 1073-78. Instead, the district court merely reduced several fees or amounts by 
an arbitrary number, without explaining why the reductions were made or why reductions 
were not made for each entry. It is impossible to determine from the trial court decision how 
the attorney fee award was reached. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Third District Court has taken the role as advocate in this case, rather than 
objective fact finder and impartial reviewer of claims. The advocacy and enthusiasm of the 
lower Court took the matter out of arbitration and increased the costs and time associated 
with properly resolving the issues. Pursuant to the HO A declaration, the matter should have 
been arbitrated, was arbitrated and the arbitration decision should be affirmed and this case 
brought to an end. 
Dated this / "^ day of November, 2005 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & EOULSEN 
myer'C. Snuffer, Jr. 
ftorneys for Appellant/Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Erik A. Olsen 
Thomas J. Burns 
DURHAM, JONES & PJNEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
on this day of November, 2006. 
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505 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 
300 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84102 
SCOTT& 
BABCOCK TELEPHONE (801) 531- 7000 
A PROFESSIONAL FACSIMILE (80i) 531-7060 
CORPORATION w w w B A B C O C K S C O T T C O M 
ATTORNEYS AND 
COUNSELORS AT LAW 
ROBERT F BABCOCK 
KENT B SCOTT 
BRIAN J BABCOCK k-PMT R Q P n T T 
JASON H ROBINSON r v C I N ' D • ° ^ ^ ' ' 
CODY W WILSON ATTORNEY AT LAW 
EMAIL 
KENT@BABCOCKSCOTT COM 
September 21, 2005 
VIA E-MAIL 
P Christian Hague 
TESCH LAW OFFICES 
314 Main Street, Suite 210 
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390 
E-Mail chaque(g)teschlaw.com 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
E-mail dcsnuffer(5)aol.com 
Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L. Rich 
Counsel: 
David Slaughter and Steve Gordon have appointed me to serve as the third member of 
the arbitration panel and serve as the panel chair. 
The panel members have conferred with one another and have asked me to conduct a 
preliminary hearing conference this Friday at 2:00 p m. to discuss the pre-hearing and hearing 
procedures and rules. Counsel for both parties and the arbitration panel will participate in the 
conference Dave Slaughter has made the arrangements for you to call in and be joined in the 
conference Dial 1-888-809-4018 and then the pass code of 431156. See Mr. Slaughter's 
previous email. 
At the pre-hearing conference please be prepared to discuss matters affecting (1) the 
length of the arbitration hearing, (2) the exchange of witness and exhibit lists, (3) the 
presentation of evidence through witnesses and exhibits, (4) any outstanding discovery and 
motion matters, (5) the need for pre-hearing briefs, (6) the form of the award and (7) any other 
matter affecting the hearing process. 
EXHIBIT 
The arbitrators have scheduled one day for the arbitration hearing commencing at 9:30 
a.m. at Dave Slaughter's office on September 28, 2005. If the parties are not able to 
accommodate this date, we will need to discuss re-scheduling this matter during our telephone 
conference this Friday. 
I would like counsel for the parties to confirm and acknowledge by signing this letter that 
they have agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 Ml pending in the 
Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubek. In addition, I 
would like counsel to acknowledge the appointment and accept the following arbitration panel to 
arbitrate the issues in this case: 
Kent B. Scott - Arbitration Panel Chair neutral appointed by Arbitrators Steve Gordon and 
Dave Slaughter. Compensation rate: $220 per hour. 
David Slaughter- Party appointed neutral appointed by John L. Rich Compensation 
rate: $250 per hour with a minimum $2,500 per day guaranty. 
Steve Gordon - Party appointed neutral appointed by Thayne Canyon Homeowner's 
Association. Compensation rate: $220 per hour. 
Please contact me should you have any questions as to these matters. I will look forward 
to Friday's pre-hearing conference and working with you on this matter. 
Respectfully, 
Kent B. Scott 
Babcock Scott & Babcock 
cc: David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com] 
cc: Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw.com] 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT & CONFIRMATION 
Counsel for the parties acknowledge and agree that the above referenced matter may be 
arbitrated in accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and accept the 
arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this letter. 
P. Christian Hague 
Attorney for Thayne Canyon Homeowner's Association 
i i iuay, o c p i c i u u c i z.o, ^uuu 
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(Q&rtfetiV,. Snuffer 
Attorneyftw John. L. Rich 
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APPENDIX 2 
VIA E-MAIL 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Christian Hague 
TESCH LAWOFFICES 
314 Main Street, Suite 210 
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390 
E-Mail joet@teschlaw.com 
E-Mail chague(5)teschlaw com 
Denver C Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
E-mail dcsnuffer(5)aol com 
Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L,, %ich 
Counsel 
The panel is in receipt of Judge Lubeck's Order canceling the arbitration hearing in this 
matter scheduled for September 28, 2005. Having conferred with the panel it is our decision 
that Judge Lubek does not have the power to divest this panel of jurisdiction or cancel the 
arbitration Jurisdiction and authority to cancehthe hearing is vested in the arbitration panel by 
virtue of the Acknowledgment of the letter I sent to counsel dated September 21, 2005. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision of the panel to hold the arbitration hearing as 
scheduled. The panel will entertain arguments on the jurisdiction issue prior to commencing the 
evidentiary portion of'the hearing. 
Respectfully, 
Kent B. Scott 
Babcock Scott & Babcock 
cc:David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com] 
cc* Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw com] 
APPENDIX 3 
IN ARBITRATION 
In the Matter of the Arbitration between: 
HTHAYNE'S CANYON HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION ETAL. 
Claimants, 
vs 
IJOHN L RICH 
Respondent. 
INTERIM AWARD 
Arbitrators-
Kent B Scott 
David W Slaughter 
Steven K Gordon 
J_ 
INTRODUCTION 
THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATORS (the "Panel") were properly appointed pursuant 
to, and consistent with, paragraph 8.3 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants for the Thaynes 
Canyon Subdivision (the "CC&Rs"), and pursuant to a written agreement of the parties dated 
September 21, 2005 (the "Agreement'1). Pursuant to the Agreement, the Panel conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on September 28, 2005 in Salt Lake City, Utah Counsel for John L. Rich 
appeared at the hearing. Despite having previously agreed to the hearing date, and despite 
having notice of the hearing, counsel for Thayne's Canyon Homeowners' Association (the 
"HOA") did not appear at, and expressly declined to participate in, the hearing. The Panel has 
considered the evidence siid arguments of the parties, includmrr all wnt'en memoranda 
documents and arguments submitted by counsel for the HOA despite his decision not to 
participate m the hearing. After doing so, the Panel enters the following unanimous: 
DECISION AND INTERIM AWARD 
1. By entering into the Agreement, the parties properly granted the arbitration panel 
jurisdiction to arbitrate all claims arising under or relating to the case styled Thayne's Canyon 
Homeowner's Association et al. vs. John L. Rich pending in the Third Distnct Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah before the Hon Bruce C Lubek (Case No 050500428 Ml) A 
ORDER ll 
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2. The HOA's Request for Cancellation of Arbitration is denied. 
3. The HOA's rejection of John L. Rich's request for a variance under paragraph 4.3 
of the CC&Rs was unreasonable. Thus, Mr. Rich is entitled to a variance of paragraph 6.4 of the 
CC&Rs. Pursuant to this variance, Mr. Rich should be allowed to proceed with the addition to 
his home consistent with the current plans. 
4. This determination renders unnecessary any ruling on Mr. Rich's arguments that 
the CC&Rs have been abandoned, in whole or in part, or that the HOA has selectively and 
arbitrarily enforced provisions of the CC&Rs, including those governing set back requirements. 
5. Because Mr. Rich is the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of attorneys' 
fees and costs. Within ten days of the date of this award, counsel for Mr. Rich shall submit a 
memorandum of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Mr. Rich (the "Memorandum"), and the 
appropriate supporting affidavit(s). Counsel for the HOA shall file a response within five days 
of receipt of the Memorandum. Mr. Rich's counsel shall not file a reply unless requested by the 
Panel. 
6. The parties shall pay the Panel fees as follows: David W. Slaughter and Steve K. 
Gordon shall be paid by the party who appointed them. Each party shall pay one half of the kts 
for KLent B. Scott, who was appointed as the third arbitrator by Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Gordon. 
ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS 
The Panel provides the following comments on its own initiative to help the parties and 
their counsel understand the reasons for this award. These comments are not findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
JURISDICTION 
1. By entering into the Agreement, the parties empowered the Panel to hear this 
matter. 
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z. Subsequently, counsel for the HOA argued that the arbitration hearing was 
ordered by, and thereafter cancelled by, the Court. 
3. Counsel for Mr. Rjch argued that although the Court initially ordered the 
arbitration hearing, the parties subsequently consented to the arbitration hearing by signing the 
Agreement, which states: "I would like counsel for the parties to confirm and acknowledge by 
signing this letter that they have agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 
MI pending in the Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Baice C. 
Lubek. In addition, I would like counsel to acknowledge the appointment and accept the 
following arbitration to arbitrate the issues in this case...." 
4. The Panel and counsel participated in a preliminary scheduling conference on 
September 23, 2005. James J. Kenny, an attorney and named party plaintiff, also participated in 
the conference. Neither counsel for the HOA, nor Mr. Kenny, raised any objections to the PaneJ 
or the hearing. Counsel for Mr. Rich stated that he had reservations concerning the jurisdiction 
of the Court. However, he stated that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the 
natter being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing. 
5. At the preliminary scheduling conference, the Panel and counsel scheduled the 
bitration hearing for September 28, 2005. The Panel and counsel also discussed pre-hearing 
atters, including the parties' execution of the Agreement, the rules applicable to the arbitration 
aring, motions, discovery, exchange of witness lists and exhibits, form of the award and pre-
iring briefs. A Preliminary Scheduling Conference Order was entered and sent to counsel. 
6. Counsel for Mr. Rich executed the Agreement and added language expressly 
rving Mr. Rich's challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court, but not the Panel. 
7. On the afternoon before the scheduled arbitration hearing, the Panel received from 
resch a Request for Cancellation of Arbitration based upon the argument that Mr. Rich had 
cted to the jurisdiction of the panel." This was not true. The Panel never received any 
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objection to its jurisdiction from Mr. Rich or his counsel. Mr. Tesch did not request a hearing 
on this issue. 
8. Before the Panel could consider Mr. Tesch's request or invite a hearing on the 
issue, Mr. Tesch obtained an ex parte Order from the Court that: (a) set a show cause hearing 
before the Court on October 5; and (b) purported to cancel the ltcourt-ordered arbitration.11 There 
was no indication in the Court's order that the Court had been informed that the parties h<iu 
signed the Agreement, which confers jurisdiction on the Panel independent, of any pnor court 
order. Based on this development, late in the day on September 27, 2005, Mr. Tesch's legal 
assistant informed the Panel that "the hearing has been cancelled.11 The Panel received the 
Court's Order canceling the alteration hearing at approximately 5:00 p.m. 
9. The Panel 'then convened via telephone. 
10. The Panel determined that the arbitration hearing should proceed and that counsel 
should be heard on the HOA's request that the Panel cancel the arbitration hearing, and on 
related matters of the Panel's jurisdiction. The Panel emailed a letter to that effect to counsel, 
and attempted to contact both counsel by telephone. 
11. On September 28, 2005, counsel for Mr. Rich was present with a witness. 
Counsel for the HOA did not appear. The Panel telephoned Mr. Tesch, who: (a) refused to 
discuss the matter with the Panel; (b) stated that he would not participate in the arbitration 
hearing; and (c) stated that he would state in position in writing. Counsel for Mr. Rich reiterated 
that he was not objecting to the jurisdiction of the Panel and requested the arbitration hearing 
proceed. 
12. Subsequently, the Panel received a letter from counsel for the HOA in which he 
stated that: (a) he considered the arbitration to be Court-ordered, and (b) the Panel had no 
authority to act independent of the Court. 
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13. Because of the Court's order canceling the hearing, the Panel was concerned 
about proceeding with arbitration hearing. The Panel did not want to convey any disrespect to 
the Court. However, after deliberating, the Panel unanimously determined that although the 
arbitration was initially ordered by the Court, it ceased to be Court-ordered when the parties 
executed the Agreement, in which they consented in writing to the arbitration of all issues in the 
underlying case, consented to use the arbitrators that had been appointed, and participated in a 
preliminary scheduling conference relating to the governance of the arbitration process. There 
never was an objection to the arbitration hearing or to the Panel. In fact, both parties noted . 
technical objections to arbitration, even as ordered by the Court, but waived those objections in 
favor of the arbitration, and confirmed that agreement in writing. 
14. In sum the arbitration hearing proceeded not pursuant to the Court's order, but 
rather pursuant to the Agreement (consistent with paragraph 8.3 of the CC&Rs), which granted 
jurisdiction to the Panel independent of any court order. The parties also participated in a 
oreliminary hearing that resulted in the governance of the arbitration process. 
15. Based on the foregoing, the Panel determines and concludes that jurisdiction of 
le dispute between the parties passed by written agreement to the Panel when the parties 
Dnsented to the arbitration in signing the Agreement and participated in the preliminary 
heduling conference. 
16. This Interim Award is not intended to affect the Court's Temporary Restraining 
der, Order to Show Cause or any other matters in this case. The scope of the Panel's 
sdiction is limited to the issues submitted under the Agreement, which have been decided 
z'm. 
CONCLUSION 
The Panel confirms that this Intenm Award is a complete disposition of all the issues 
litted to them under the CC&Rs, the Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated September 
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16, 2005, the Agreement, and the evidence and legal arguments which were presented in 
connection with the arbitration hearing held in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 28, 2005. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on this <p J day of September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ent was served by the method indicated below, to the following 
Joseph E Tesch 
P Christian Hague 
Paul R Poulsen 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P C 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
P O Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060-3390 
Facsimile (435)649-2561 
Denver Snuffer 
NELSON, SNUFFER 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Facsimile (801)576-1960 
Certified Mail, 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
^Facsimile 
yV S Cemfied Mail 1 
D Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
^Facsimile ! 
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SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 - 4 1 0 2 
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WWW BABCOCKSCOTT COM 
ROBERTF BABCOCK 
KENT B SCOTT 
BRIAN J BABCOCK KENT B SCOTT 
JASON H ROBINSON ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CODY W WILSON EMAIL KEKT@BABCOCKSCOTT COM 
October 12, 2005 
VIA U. S. MAIL & E-MAIL 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Christian Hague 
TESCH LAW OFFICES 
314 Main Street, Suite 210 
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390 
E-Mail joet@teschlaw.com 
E-Mail chague@teschlaw.com 
Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L. Rich 
Third District Court, Summit County - Case 050500428 Ml 
Counsel: 
The panel acknowledges receipt of your letter forwarding a copy of Judge Lubeck's ruling 
and order in the parties' litigation. We have also received a copy of your later letter regarding 
Respondent's Motion and Affidavit for Attorneys' Fees. 
With all due respect to Judge Lubeck's conclusions concerning the panel's understanding 
2nd beliefs going forward, it remains our unanimous position that the arbitration was conducted 
in accordance with controlling authority. The decision to proceed was carefully considered and 
only after affording both you and Mr. Snuffer the opportunity to address your motion to cancel 
the arbitration. As Mr. Tesch will recall, he flatly refused to do so, challenging the "jurisdiction" 
of the panel, despite the confirmed agreement to submit to the panel the issues outlined. We 
considered nonetheless your letter explaining your position and detennined that it was contrary 
to the collective interests of the parties to further postpone the matter. 
While we appreciate that Mr. Tesch, personally, did not participate in the scheduling 
hearing that led to the agreement signed by counsel for both sides, the reason the panel 
required that signed agreement was to prevent either party from relying ultimately on issues of 
waiver or jurisdiction to challenge the ultimate arbitration award. Each side (Mr. Hague for 
yours) confirmed to the panel its separate agreement to arbitrate, specifically waiving any and 
all objections each disclosed as having raised with the Court. It was on that basis alone that we 
tnfr SCOTT & 
Hill BABCOCK 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
• p r to josepn t i escn, 
Bfenesday, October 12, 2005 
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In Mr. Tesch's letter of October 12, 2005, he requested the panel to inform the parties as 
to their intent to proceed to rule on the award of attorneys fees to Respondent as the prevailing 
party in this matter. We have not been served with Respondent's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. 
However, in light of the Court's order vacating the Interim Award the matter of attorneys' fees 
under that aVvard is rendered moot. Under § 78-31 a-129 of the Revised Utah Uniform 
Arbitration Act the parties may appeal Judge Lubeck's Order. However, the Panel intends to 
take no further action in the arbitration until it is directed otherwise. 
Respectfully, 
/Kent B. Scott, Panel Chair 
Babcock Scott & Babcock 
cc: Hon. Bruce C. Lubeck via facsimile (435) 336-3030 
cc:vT)enver C. Snuffer, Jr. [dcsnuff@aol.com] 
cc: David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com] 
cc: Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw.com] 
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ARCHITECT 
8 0 1 - 5 1 8 - 6 5 0 1 CELL 
AUGUST 26, 2005 
MR. JAMES KENNY 
58 THAYNES CANYON DRIVE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
RE' PERMITTED ADDITION TO 57 THAYNES CANYON DRIVE 
DEAR MR. KENNY, 
PURSUANT TO YOUR LETTER, J O H N RICH WOULD LIKE THIS MATTER TO BE RESOLVED UNDER 
ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' CLAUSE IN THE C C R S . 
MR. RICH IS ASKING FOR THIS HEARING BY AN ARBITRATOR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING 
REASONS; 
T H E CITY HAS GRANTED A BUILDING PERMIT FOR THIS PARTICULAR REMODELING 
PROJECT, A L L FEZS HAVE BEEN PAID AND WORK HAS BEGUN, 
I HAVE TAKEN REASONABLE EFFORTS IN STEPPING THE FOUNDATION (TWICE), 
LIMITING THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT, THE ACTUAL ENCROACHMENT IS LESS 
THAN 1 0 % (1 1 SQUARE FEET) OF THE ALLOWABLE ENCROACHMENT ALLOWED BY 
PARK CITY'S REQUIREMENTS. 
TH IS WILL BE PRESENTED AS A 'HARDSHIP CASE' DUE TO THE NON-PARALLEL 
PROPERTY LINES, T H E CONVERGING PROPERTY UNES PROVIDE A VERY LIMIT AREA TO 
BUILD THIS MODEST ADDITION, 
MR. KENNY, WE HAVE VERBALLY PRESENTED OUR CASE TO YOU, MR, S I U A R T AND MR. PIPER 
AND THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OP THE HARDSHIP AND REASONABLE 
EFFORTS TAKEN IN THE DESIGN TO MINIMIZE THE ENCROACHMENT W E HAVE NOT BEEN 
ALLOWED TO PRESENT OUR CASE IN FRONT OF THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE AND WE 
HAVE NOT SEEN THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING WHERE OUR CASE WAS HEARD. 
MRS. STUART, THE NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH OF THIS PROPERTY WAS SOLICITED BY 
MR. STUART IN FRONT OF ME ABOUT HER THOUGHTS ON OUR PLANED ADDITION. 
MRS. STUART'S RESPONSE WAS " J U S T LET THEM DO WHAT THEY WANT TO D O " IN ADDITION, 
THERE IS NO 'ARCHITECTURAL GUIDE1 THAT IS REFERENCED IN THE CCRfs THAT A HOME 
OWNER CAN USE WHEN CONSIDERING AN ADDITION, 
WE ARE ASKING THE HOA TO STEP ASIDE AND SUGGEST AN ARBITRATOR TO HEAR THIS 
MATTER AND REMOVE THE EMOTION OUT OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. WE FEEL OUR 
REQUEST AND PROPOSED ADDITION IS REASONABLE AS ALLOWED IN THE CCRS. 
rxaoz 
MICHAEL DECARLO 
ARCHITECT FOR MR. J O H N RICH 
